

heterozygote-advantage theories in mind, in 1987 Weinrich proposed a new theory that put forth a better evolutionary *raison d'être* for homosexuality in societies in which everyone is expected to marry. In such societies, sexual attraction is often not high on the list of reasons to marry; pure lust is expected to be gratified in extramarital liaisons or not at all. Ancient Greece, modern urban Mexico, medieval Japan, and the United States in several of the past few centuries may well constitute such societies. "Being homosexual" in such a society, as opposed to "being heterosexual," means being inclined to having homosexual relations outside of marriage instead of heterosexual ones outside of marriage. Obviously, this kind of homosexuality can be considered a form of **bisexuality**, and interestingly such a bisexual or homosexual person has two reproductive advantages over a pure heterosexual when viewed in sociobiological terms: he or she would be less likely to have children out of wedlock, and she or he would be less likely to protest a marriage arranged by the parents (i.e., one would be less likely to be already in love with a member of the opposite sex to whom one might have wished to become married). Both of these traits had previously been proposed by sociobiologists as reproductively altruistic acts (in work published before this theory was circulated).

Conclusion. Of course, any sociobiological theory worth its salt must be highly aware of social and environmental influences on the traits being considered, because natural selection is extremely sensitive to the social forces at work in the society which sets the rules. If your society offers no berdache role, you can try to improvise one (as modern "drag queens" seem sometimes to do) but it is unlikely that your IF will thereby increase. Sociobiological theories help to explain why imprinting of sexual object choices could have evolved in some species to be fixed (like footprints in concrete) and in others to be easily changeable (like footprints in

sand). Indeed, it is even conceivable that "fixed" types may have begun evolving in some societies and "changeable" types in other societies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Alan C. Bell, Martin S. Weinberg, and Sue Kiefer Hammersmith, *Sexual Preference: Its Development in Men and Women*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981; G. G. Gallup, Jr., and S. D. Suarez, "Homosexuality as a By-product of Selection for Optimal Heterosexual Strategies," *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, 26 (1983), 315-22; G. Evelyn Hutchinson, "A Speculative Consideration of Certain Possible Forms of Sexual Selection in Man," *American Naturalist*, 93 (1959), 81-91; John A. W. Kirsch and James Eric Rodman, "Selection and Sexuality: The Darwinian View of Homosexuality," in *Homosexuality: Social, Psychological, and Biological Issues*, W. Paul, J. D. Weinrich, J. C. Gonsiorek, and M. E. Hotvedt, eds., Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1982, pp. 183-95; Richard C. Pillard and James D. Weinrich, "Evidence of Familial Nature of Male Homosexuality," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 43 (1986), 808-12; Michael Ruse, "Are There Gay Genes? Sociobiology and Homosexuality," *Journal of Homosexuality*, 6:4 (1981) 5-34; James D. Weinrich, *Human Reproductive Strategy: The Importance of Income Unpredictability, and the Evolution of Non-Reproduction*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University Department of Biology, 1976; idem, "Is Homosexuality Biologically Natural?" in W. Paul, et al., op cit., pp. 197-211; idem, "A New Sociobiological Theory of Homosexuality Applicable to Societies with Universal Marriage," *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 8 (1987), 37-47; idem, *Sexual Landscapes: Why We Are What We Are, Why We Love Whom We Love*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987.

James D. Weinrich

SOCIOLOGY

The term sociology was coined by Auguste Comte in 1836. Since his time sociology has developed into a major discipline, with particular resonance in English-speaking countries.

Yet academic sociology is in some respects a codification of knowledge that

has always been available. In all societies individuals have some view of what is shared by other individuals known to them. Folk theories exist everywhere about what is common to members of a human group as well what contrasts with qualities found in other groups. Programs for scientific comparison of the evolution of social arrangements were stimulated by reports of social arrangements at variance with European ones made available during the Age of Discovery (after 1492). The Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution helped to augment this stimulus and channel it.

Among those trying to make sense of those changes and their place as part of a process of social evolution were the three architects of sociology's "grand theory": Karl Marx (1818–1883), Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), and Max Weber (1864–1919). None of them was professionally trained in sociology, and their precursors in theorizing about social order and structure included Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Vico, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.

The Basic Problem. The central concern of sociology elaborating this patrimony is world-historical changes in systems of domination. Its aim is to explain how one system (e.g., capitalism) functions at a particular time and how one system arises from another (e.g., capitalism succeeding feudalism). To those ensconced at the discipline's center, others chronicling the lifeways of "queers" have seemed to be engaged in a dubious enterprise unlikely to contribute to the building of a unified theory of society. Indeed, description of how people actually live has often struck those concerned with abstract, general theories of society as a diversion from the path to knowledge. And when the people described are homosexual, motives such as voyeuristic titillation or special pleading are imputed. Yet the macrohistorical processes projected by Marx and Durkheim from their consideration of European history have not been enacted

elsewhere as predicted, nor have subsequent events in Europe followed their scenarios of primordial loyalties eroding with increasing industrialization.

Even the builders of American sociological traditions, who focused on smaller social units over briefer periods of time, expected contrasts of race, ethnicity, and gender to wane. The classic work (1913–18) of W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki on Polish peasants emigrating to the United States exemplified Durkheim's conception of the (necessary) breakdown of traditional (peasant) society with accompanying individual pathology which reflected social disorganization—both of which were expected to disappear with integration into the modern world of, say, Chicago. Empirical work in the Chicago School tradition treated ethnic **subcultures** under the rubric of "social disorganization," an anomaly destined to be resolved as contact with dominant American society reduced differences. This process—variously termed assimilation, acculturation, accommodation—was supposed to eliminate hostility and, by the same token, conflict. Since conflict was regarded as a product of individual attitudes and values rather than of structured inequalities, it was expected to diminish as contact dissolved **stereotypes** and cultural differences—the sources of intergroup conflict. Ascribed characteristics (such as race, gender, and possibly sexual orientation) have taken on an importance quite out of keeping with the confident expectations of those in the "grand tradition" that these need not be considered, because their significance would decline eventually and disappear.

Historical reality has proved to be quite different. Groups based on characteristics which classical theory regarded as already anachronistic a century ago have not merely "assumed political functions comparable to those of a subordinate class; they have in important respects become more effective than social classes in mobilizing their forces in pursuit of collective

ends" (Parkin, p. 622). Insofar as sociology aims to analyze what is actually occurring rather than to invoke the tarrying of the messiah, it must endeavor to explain the continued strength and/or emergence of social movements based on consciousness of shared ascribed characteristics. The emergence of a group consciousness and subsequent mobilization of a "people" who could not seriously have been designated a "group" three decades ago contrasts markedly with the erosion of class consciousness and the increasing impotence of organized labor. Not just Marxist theory, but classical bourgeois social theory, including the two major American perspectives descended from Durkheim and from Thomas, functionalism and symbolic interactionism respectively, have ill prepared the investigator to understand the quite unpredicted emergence and successes of racial and ethnic, women's and gay **movements**. Although understanding homosexual socialization has not been a central theme for sociological theory, prominent attempts to encompass American (male) homosexuality in the mid-to-late twentieth century will be discussed below.

Functionalism. The structuralist-functional tradition included some recognition that moral consensus requires some target: norm-drenched individuals need before them the cautionary example of negative role models. To be certain that they are within the bounds of propriety, someone else must be condemned to obloquy outside the boundaries. Blatant specimens of inadequate masculine socialization can be tolerated as a butt for jokes (among other things), because such persons serve as a horrible warning of what boys must avoid becoming. Possibly, public punishment of sodomites served the same "function" in Europe during the **Middle Ages**, in **Aztec Mexico**, and in the pre-Columbian **Andes**. Ridicule was sufficient in North American **Indian** tribes and in the **Pacific** cultures of Polynesia. To define the moral unit "us" of a society there must be others beyond the moral

pale. Durkheim wrote of "normal" rates of deviance and crime necessary to provide occasions for exemplary punishments to affirm the moral order, publicly fixing the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Durkheim's intellectual heirs have been concerned with boundary maintenance both between and within societies. Of course, to serve an exemplary role as a moral counterexample a deviant (of whatever sort) must be generally recognized as such. Prior to the **Kinsey** findings concerning **incidence**, when it was assumed a homosexual was a *rara avis* (the village queer) and that one could be readily recognized by everyone (because of their obvious **gender non-conformity**), homosexuality seemed consistent enough with a moral consensus model of society, i.e., it was "normal deviance" rather than subversion of the moral order.

The landmark study that showed how widespread homosexuality could reinforce rather than challenge the moral order was that of Reiss on hustlers and their clients (1961). For **trade** individuals, masculinity was defined by insertor behavior. In their view, the "**queers**" were the insertees, so their participation did not erode trade masculine status, so long as they gave nothing more than their cocks (and possibly an occasional beating), i.e., so long as they "never took it." **Prostitution** was not perceived as demasculinizing as such; apparently this stigmatizing definition was evaded along with that of "queer." Such a system could persist only with the collusion of clients willing to enact the role of the "queer" by not challenging the valuation and self-image of those whose behavior was that of homosexual prostitution. So long as this system's script for the dominance of the masculine actor and the submission (and optimally feminization) of the "queer" was credited, validation of masculinity and depreciation of homosexuality were actually supported by "deviant" acts. The "queers" kneeling to worship the symbols of trade's masculinity quarantined the

stigma, protecting the masculine self-conceptions of their sexual partners. Beyond the financial rewards, sexual release, and the reassurance of masculinity, the trade participants were exposed to the dangers of succumbing to any temptations toward passivity. Most presumably "learned" they weren't "queer"—and did not have to be such to get off with men. Reiss' study did not assess the degree of "role distance" of those enacting the "queer" role versus the degree of self-hatred, but to whatever extent those playing the "queer" role credited its truth (and justice), the moral order in general and the superiority of heterosexual males in particular were reinforced by "deviant" acts.

How far men could venture into homosexuality—beyond adolescence and even beyond exclusively insertor behavior—without considering themselves implicated as "queers" either by themselves or by their partners was demonstrated by the preponderance of married men observed by Laud Humphreys in his study of toilet sex, *Tearoom Trade*. Not only was homosexuality compatible with the existing moral order, so were homosexuals, for it was not just "trade" who "compensated" for suspect sexual behavior with hyper-conformity in espousing traditional social values (especially in regard to sex and gender). The stratification of sexual encounters (with the "masculine principle" on top in every sense), along with the "consent" to stigmatization of those seeking "real men" as partners was perfectly consistent with the Durkheimian vision.

Blumstein and Schwartz' rich comparative study of married, non-married cohabiting, gay male, and lesbian couples follows the functionalist tradition into a social world in which such stratification is mostly obsolete—although both lesbians and gay men in their sample remain sensitive to being fit into the opposite gender role. Functionalists delineated complementary instrumental (the husband oriented toward the world outside the

family) and affective (the wife oriented inward to the family) roles necessary to the functioning of small groups (not just families). Blumstein and Schwartz substitute a new polarity—work-centered/relationship-centered—for the instrumental/affective one. They contend that for a relationship to endure, at least one partner must be oriented inward toward keeping the relationship going well, but do not try to sort out whether relationships work better when both partners are relationship-centered, or if there is some advantage to one partner being oriented outward from the relationship to the work world (i.e., whether the roles are genuinely complementary, not merely different).

Symbolic Interactionism. In the pre-contemporary period of relative neglect, most sociological research dealing with homosexuality was done, however, within another, indigenous tradition which rivaled functionalism for hegemony in postwar American sociology: symbolic interactionism. The Chicago School included a tradition of studying "unconventional" careers (e.g., the typical patterns of taxi-hall dancers, jack-rollers, hoboes) in the same way as the subcultures built by practically every imaginable social category that could be found in Chicago, except homosexuals. Like Durkheim, the founders of the Chicago School believed the all too visible social pathology they saw around them would first fade, then gradually disappear (a process to be accelerated by sociological knowledge itself) as a modern moral order emerged, to be consolidated and expanded. The modern society envisioned from Chicago was more ethnically diverse than was the *Gesellschaft* conceived by European theorists. Still, Chicago sociologists believed that the knocking together of those with different cultural backgrounds would break down, or at least wear off the rough edges of culturally distinctive differences. And, for whatever reason, this tradition was far more concerned with documenting the stages in what they were certain was the

evolution of antagonistic groups into a future unity (moral order) than with discussing the overall process: the forest of the evolution to a more integrated social/moral order often disappeared from view in Chicago descriptions of particular trees (roles, groups, etc.). Nevertheless, the Chicago tradition focused on socialization decades before functionalists turned to trying to account for the actual transmission of social order. The Chicago model of socialization held that an **identity** (i.e., a self) is an internalization of the view of significant others. If a behavior (say a boy playing with dolls) is interpreted by others (e.g., parents) as instancing a category (say, *sissy*), they will treat the boy as if he is that kind of person. By recognizing their conception of what he is, the boy will learn who (what) he is, and if this self is credible, the behavior will be transformed into a stable pattern (conduct) and a defining feature of self.

According to symbolic interactionist theory, the self is a product of social definition. What transforms behavior into conduct is **labeling** by others. In the social system of "trade" and "queers" discussed above, the homosexual behavior of the "trade" is not transformed into homosexual conduct (or identity), because the "queers" who know about the behavior do not so label them. Unless the **police** chance upon them in the act, no homosexual label is applied. But what of the "queers"? Who labeled them? Within encounters with the "peers," "trade" of course did, but most encounters began with someone already set in the "queer" role, so explanation must look back before the particular occasion to locate the manufacture of the "queer." Unfortunately for the theory, most people with homosexual, gay, or lesbian self-identities report never having been labeled. In his pioneer study of 182 men who considered themselves homosexual, Dank (p. 123) found "no cases in which the subject had come out in the context of being arrested on a charge involving homosexuality or being fired

from a job because of homosexual behavior. . . . 4.5 percent of the sample came out in the context of public exposure." Although labeling theory posits labeling by agents of the state (policemen, judges) in official records, those trying to rescue the theory might extend "labeling" from official acts to internalization of everyday epithets. Such a tack does not, however, salvage the theory, for even in this broader sense, labeling does not account for the data which have been gathered. Even those explaining adult homosexuality on the basis of childhood **effeminacy** do not find more than half of those with the effect reporting the supposed cause, even if labeling as effeminate is widened to self-labeling.

That homosexual conduct is generally reached without ever being labeled by others should suffice to discredit "labeling theory," and some men report having **come out** (and have in some cases joined gay organizations) before having had any homosexual encounters. That is, identity (secondary deviance) sometimes precedes behavior (primary deviance). For lesbians, Ponse (p. 125) lists a series of elements in the process of identity formation that reverses the primary-secondary deviance order. The first element is that the individual has a subjective sense of being different from heterosexual persons and identifies this difference as feelings of sexual-emotional attraction to her own sex. Second, an understanding of the homosexual or lesbian significance of these feelings is acquired. Third, the individual accepts these feelings and their implications for identity, i.e., the person comes out or accepts the identity of lesbian. Fourth, the individual seeks a community of like persons. Fifth, the individual becomes involved in a sexual-emotional lesbian relationship.

Rather than those with a gay identity being a subset of those engaged in some homosexual behavior, the sets intersect with most of those with gay identity within the intersection and most of those

with some homosexual behavior not in the intersection. Whether the tinier subset of those labeled is wholly in the intersection of these sets is unknown.

Stigma Theory and the Rejection of the Deviant Role. Having explored adult males who engaged in homosexual behavior, and whose denial of homosexuality correlated with social and political traditionalism, Laud Humphreys became the first sociologist to give sustained attention to the puzzles homosexual reality posed to sociological theory. In *Out of the Closets* Humphreys set out to analyze the then-young gay liberation movement, which was comprised increasingly of those who had never been labeled, yet openly proclaimed their gayness, adopted various idioms of the counterculture, and sought coalitions with other groups challenging the status quo. Humphreys did not attempt to fit the emergence of the gay liberation movement into the functionalist or labeling frameworks discussed above. Instead, he built on Goffman's rambling, but suggestive book, *Stigma*.

Erving Goffman (1922–1982), whose major concern is specified in the title of his first book, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), was interested in how individuals manage potentially discrediting information. He started with the assumption that in a large-scale, mobile society, no one is quite what he or she seems to be, that is, everyone has some things to hide; "deviance" involves not a few "deviants," but everyone (albeit to varying extents, depending on the social standards for the gravity of what they have to hide). For Goffman, everyone who is not discredited is (to some degree) discreditable. The discreditable must cope with anxiety about being found out, the discredited with anxiety about being rejected on the basis (which they themselves may consider legitimate) that they are "that kind of person" (whatever kind does not deserve to be treated as a whole human being). For Goffman, feeling oneself discredited does not require labeling

by anyone else, nor for that matter do such feelings require any objective basis (such as "primary deviance"). Since labels are selectively self-applied, being frozen in the naming glare of some representative of Society (parent, teacher, policeman) is far from the only path to a sense of spoiled identity. Goffman's extension of the concept of managing discrediting information from exotic "deviants" to everyone led him to glimpse another way of being in the world: accepting that one is indeed an instance of a discredited category, but challenging the legitimacy of that category's opprobrium—that is, neither trying to deny a category ("I'm not like them") nor living in disgrace ("We deserve it"; "We brought it on ourselves"; and so forth), but instead affirming "I'm fine anyway" (e.g., gay and proud).

Goffman glimpsed the possibility of organizing to challenge the very stigma that is the only common feature of a group, and Humphreys provided an exemplar in his case study of a movement committed to transvaluing the negative valuation of homosexuality. "Normalization" of deviance can be a group strategy, but it required a group. Organization of a movement, in Humphreys' view, had two prerequisites: recognition that present treatment of one's kind is intolerable, and conviction that change is possible. Both conceptions now seem so obvious that one is tempted to forget they were once widely unrecognized, when the sinfulness or sickness that was homosexuality was perceived to be inevitable and just.

Conceiving the existing reality as intolerable and changeable was clearly necessary for the formation of a social movement. Undoubtedly the Kinsey data and the example of the Negro civil rights movement encouraged the early homophile movement. The formation of a critical mass of people who viewed themselves as defined to some extent by homosexual desires was the central precondition for change, and was itself disproportionately facilitated by even tiny organizations

challenging the legitimacy of the dominant society's picture of homosexuals. There were other fostering circumstances. Wartime **homosociality** was one, whether or not World War II sped urban migration for those who became involved in the homosexual subculture, and even if official labeling was not part of their experience. Another material change abetting the postwar expansion of public settings for meeting others interested in homosexuality was the introduction of penicillin, and the concomitant reduction of anxiety about venereal diseases. Cultural factors which were important to what the critical mass did include the North American tradition of printing dissident views and some general valuing of freedom of the press—a value missing everywhere else in the Western hemisphere, and a value that was not sufficient in itself for the extension to the homophile press—the tradition of voluntary associations derived from the religious pluralism of the United States, and the welfare state's takeover of insurance against disaster (the "safety net" function formerly discharged by the family).

Growth and Diversification of Gay Culture. Early social science discussions of the "homosexual **community**" treated it as static, rather than recently-emerged (post-World War II). Since at least the mid-1970s, sociologists writing about North American gay culture and gay communities have given nominal recognition to changes, particularly more assertive demands for social respect and the diversification of institutions catering to an open, self-accepting gay market. How did the institutionally elaborated gay communities of the 1970s come about? Obviously, some of the same factors, notably the coalescence of a critical mass, the conception that change was possible, the "mobilization of symbolic resources" (including an embryonic gay press, distorted mass media coverage, and public examples), and other factors adduced in the discussion of the "evolution" of gay

political organizations, apply to the "evolution" of gay culture at the same time in the same places.

In folk conceptions of the past, it is well known that "in the beginning was the **bar**"—or more exactly, temporal and spatial segments of bars. Before the rise of the present range of gay institutions, what most lesbians and gay men seeking fellow lesbians and gay men did between working, sleep, and sex was to drink. The gay bar was the first gay institution, and for most members of the "pre-Stonewall generation" was often the only one. Before gay people demanded acceptance and forged their own institutions, profitable gay bars provided a modicum of anonymity and protection from official and unofficial interference with gay sociation. Of course, bars provided a setting for arranging sexual liaisons, but their historical importance for the development of a gay people has more to do with revealing to many individuals that they were not unique: not only were there similarly-homosexually-inclined others, but these others were not (all) monsters, and were numerous enough to have meeting places (of varying degrees of furtiveness and friendliness).

"In the beginning was the bar" will strike some as sociology again discovering the obvious. However, what is noteworthy about bars' being the first gay institutions to develop is that it holds true in other cultures (e.g., Latin America, the Philippines) in which only embryonic challenges to the equation of homosexuality with female gender behavior have been made. In cultures where homosexuality is age-defined, neither gay bars nor gay identity have developed. Not that alcohol is a necessary catalyst for the crystalization of gay identity, but drinking together represents a degree of solidarity which is lacking where one is expected to "graduate" from the receptor role with age. Solidarity with peers is what is important, not alcohol dissolving inhibitions and generating addiction. Another reason to consider the (historical) primacy of gay bars is that,

challenging the legitimacy of the dominant society's picture of homosexuals. There were other fostering circumstances. Wartime **homosociality** was one, whether or not World War II sped urban migration for those who became involved in the homosexual subculture, and even if official labeling was not part of their experience. Another material change abetting the postwar expansion of public settings for meeting others interested in homosexuality was the introduction of penicillin, and the concomitant reduction of anxiety about venereal diseases. Cultural factors which were important to what the critical mass did include the North American tradition of printing dissident views and some general valuing of freedom of the press—a value missing everywhere else in the Western hemisphere, and a value that was not sufficient in itself for the extension to the homophile press—the tradition of voluntary associations derived from the religious pluralism of the United States, and the welfare state's takeover of insurance against disaster (the "safety net" function formerly discharged by the family).

Growth and Diversification of Gay Culture. Early social science discussions of the "homosexual **community**" treated it as static, rather than recently-emerged (post-World War II). Since at least the mid-1970s, sociologists writing about North American gay culture and gay communities have given nominal recognition to changes, particularly more assertive demands for social respect and the diversification of institutions catering to an open, self-accepting gay market. How did the institutionally elaborated gay communities of the 1970s come about? Obviously, some of the same factors, notably the coalescence of a critical mass, the conception that change was possible, the "mobilization of symbolic resources" (including an embryonic gay **press**, distorted mass media coverage, and public examples), and other factors adduced in the discussion of the "evolution" of gay

political organizations, apply to the "evolution" of gay culture at the same time in the same places.

In folk conceptions of the past, it is well known that "in the beginning was the **bar**"—or more exactly, temporal and spatial segments of bars. Before the rise of the present range of gay institutions, what most lesbians and gay men seeking fellow lesbians and gay men did between working, sleep, and sex was to drink. The gay bar was the first gay institution, and for most members of the "pre-Stonewall generation" was often the only one. Before gay people demanded acceptance and forged their own institutions, profitable gay bars provided a modicum of anonymity and protection from official and unofficial interference with gay sociation. Of course, bars provided a setting for arranging sexual liaisons, but their historical importance for the development of a gay people has more to do with revealing to many individuals that they were not unique: not only were there similarly-homosexually-inclined others, but these others were not (all) monsters, and were numerous enough to have meeting places (of varying degrees of furtiveness and friendliness).

"In the beginning was the bar" will strike some as sociology again discovering the obvious. However, what is noteworthy about bars' being the first gay institutions to develop is that it holds true in other cultures (e.g., Latin America, the Philippines) in which only embryonic challenges to the equation of homosexuality with female gender behavior have been made. In cultures where homosexuality is age-defined, neither gay bars nor gay identity have developed. Not that alcohol is a necessary catalyst for the crystallization of gay identity, but drinking together represents a degree of solidarity which is lacking where one is expected to "graduate" from the receptor role with age. Solidarity with peers is what is important, not alcohol dissolving inhibitions and generating addiction. Another reason to consider the (historical) primacy of gay bars is that,

given the generally higher prices of drinks, undesirability of locales, and poor service, gay bars are also the prototype of businesses selling their patrons to each other. Manifestly, the business of a bar is to sell drinks, and the central importance of the bar (followed by the institution of the cocktail party) likely explains the high rates of lesbian and gay alcoholism. As Nardi put it, "Drinking is not used to escape from something; rather it is used to join something. Initial socialization into a gay community often occurs by attending gay bars and enacting the drinking roles perceived as essential to gay identity" (p. 28). As a result, "Getting drunk . . . is normal trouble in the gay community, rather than deviance" (Warren, p. 58). Other preconditions create other institutions.

Organs for communicating a positive view of a group are essential to positive self-identification, as well as to political organization and social coordination. In the United States early homophile organizations produced periodicals, and ONE, Inc. in particular fought a protracted legal battle (1954–58) for the use of the U.S. mail. In Latin America gay periodicals continue to be seized as subversive even when there is no conceivable prurience to interpret as obscene, as in Mexico, where the *Ley de Imprenta* gives a judge discretion to condemn printed, written, or duplicated materials as "apologías de un vicio" (vice advocacy). Outside metropolises with gay ghettos, many people learn that homosexuality is a possible way of life from print media, the existence of which is now taken for granted by those living in gay worlds (including gay scholarship).

State provision of insurance against disaster (Medicaid, worker's compensation, unemployment insurance) and old age (Social Security) is perhaps the most important replacement of the traditional family function, and increases the likelihood of residential concentration of homosexually inclined persons. Parental control was eroded by the inability to

guarantee a livelihood for the next generation and by increased geographical mobility—opportunity was beyond the reach and often beyond even the view of parents. Partner choice then became a more personal decision. Welfare state protection of individuals clearly reduced the necessity of reliance on the family and may well be a prerequisite to gay society (contrast Latin America).

Whether geographical mobility was necessary to populate contemporary gay ghettos has been questioned. Similarly, while newly created public places such as railway stations and parks provided anonymous meeting places in the nineteenth century, there had been recognized trysting places in pre-capitalist mercantile centers, such as Venice, Paris, and Seville. Welfare protection, geographical mobility, voluntary relationships, all releasing individuals from dependence on and control by the family, were at least foreshadowed by monasticism and the military in Western history—locales in which widespread homosexuality occurred or has been posited.

The timing of the emergence of persons recognized by others in terms of homosexual preference is a major point of contention in the social constructionist position formulated at the University of Essex and elsewhere ca. 1981. Suggested dates for this transformation range from the fourteenth century until as recently as the end of the World War II. The flux of possible human desire has so impressed advocates of this view that they have ignored the very limited number of known social organizations of homosexuality (by age differences, gender differences, or egalitarian comradeship), historically attested labels for roles (e.g., sodomite and catamite), and the necessary economy of schematization in all cognitive categorization. Actual comparisons of social constructions across space or time have not generally been made by ostensible social constructionists, who seem more intent

on avoiding being labeled themselves than in exploring differences and commonalities of social processes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz, *American Couples*, New York: William Morrow, 1983; Barry Dank, "Coming Out in the Gay World," *Psychiatry*, 34 (1971), 180-97; Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959; idem, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963; David F. Greenberg, *The Construction of Homosexuality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988; Laud Humphreys, *Tearoom Trade*, 2nd ed., Chicago: Aldine, 1975; idem, *Out of the Closets*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972; Stephen O. Murray, *Social Theory, Homosexual Realities*, New York: Gay Academic Union, 1984; Peter M. Nardi, "Alcoholism and Homosexuality," *Journal of Homosexuality*, 7 (1982), 9-25; David Parkin, "Social Stratification," in R. Nisbet and T. Bottomore, eds., *History of Sociological Analysis*, New York: Basic Books, 1978, pp. 599-632; Barbara Ponse, *Identity in the Lesbian World*, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1978; Albert J. Reiss, "The Social Integration of 'Queers' and 'Peers,'" *Social Problems*, 9 (1961), 102-20; Carol A. B. Warren, *Identity and Community in the Gay World*, Boston: Wiley, 1974.

Stephen O. Murray

SOCRATES (469-399 B.C.)

Athenian philosopher. The son of a well-to-do sculptor or stonemason, he was later reduced to poverty. Late in life he married Xantippe, who became proverbial in subsequent ages for her bad temper and shrewishness, though the stories about her may have been exaggerated. In early life he was interested in the scientific philosophy of his time and is said to have associated with Archelaus the physicist, but in the period best known to posterity he had abandoned these interests and was concerned solely with the right conduct of life, a quest which he conducted by the so-called "Socratic" method of cross-examin-

ing the individuals whom he encountered. While serving in the army he gained a great reputation for bravery, and as one of the presidents of the Athenian Assembly at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, he courageously refused to put an illegal motion to the vote despite the fury of the multitude. In 399 he was brought to trial before a popular jury on the charge of introducing strange gods and of "corrupting the youth." There has been considerable dispute over the precise meaning of the indictment, but the first part seems not to have been serious, while the second amounted to a charge that he had a "subversive" influence on the minds of the young, which was based on his known friendship with some of those who had been most prominent in their attacks on democracy in Athens. He made no attempt to placate the jury and was found guilty and sentenced to die by drinking a cup of hemlock. Though his friends could have enabled him to escape, he acquiesced to the sentence.

Socrates left no writings of his own: knowledge of his life and work comes from Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. He probably never formulated a precise philosophy. His legacy to his disciples and to later generations consisted in the method by which he analyzed and criticized the fundamental assumptions of existing systems. He probably rejected the conventional Greek religious beliefs of his time, yet professed or created no heterodox religious doctrines. From time to time he had paranormal experiences, signs, or warnings which he interpreted as guideposts to his own conduct.

His sexual life, apart from the unhappy marriage, reflected the Greek custom of *paidērasteia* to the fullest. He was both the teacher of the young men who frequented his circle and the lover of at least some of them. As a boy of seventeen he had been the favorite of Archelaus, because he was in the bloom of youthful sensuality, which later gave place to serious intellectual concerns. As an adult he